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i/ 

IMPORTANT 

COSIESPONBEWCE 


ON THE SUBJECT OF 


STATE INTEMPOSITIOH, 

BETWEEN 



His Excellency GOV. HAMILTON, 

n 


AND 






K02Xr. 70HBJ C. CAZiHOVSr, 

? 

Vice-President of the United States; 


[Copied from the Pendleton Messenger of 15th Sept. 1832.^ 


a"" 

CHARLESTON: 


i»RINTED AND SOLD BY A. E. MILLER., 
No. 4, Broad-street. 


1832 . 





[^Governor Hamilton to Hon. John C. Ca/hoitn.'] 

PENDLETON, JULY 31, 1832. 

My Dear Sir, —In reading again, a few days since, your communication 
addressed, last summer, to the editor of the ‘ Pendleton Messenger,^ containing 
an exposition of the doctrine of the right of interposition, which belongs to a 
sovereign State in this Confederacy, to arrest an usurpation, on the part of the 
General Government, of powers not delegated to it, 1 felt satisfied, not only 
from a remark which you yourself make in that article, but from an obvious 
condensation of your argument, that there were still a variety of lights in 
which the truth and vital importance of this highly conservative principle to 
the liberties of the States were quite familiar to the reflections of your own 
mind, which have not suggested themselves even to those who are the most 
zealously devoted to the doctrines in question. 

Your patience has been so heavily taxed by the late oppressive session of 
Congress (oppressive in every sense of the term) that I feel some scruple in 
placing you under the requisition which my request is about to impose; 
but if you could find leisure this summer, for my private satisfaction and 
information, to fill out your argument of the last year, by going somewhat 
more into detail both as to the principles and consequences of Nullification, 
you would add one more to the many obligations of friendship 1 owe you. As 
I shall be, during the residue of the summer, in Charleston, be pleased to 
direct to that place. 

I remain, my dear sir, with great esteem, your’s, faithfully and respecfully. 

JAMES HAMILTON, Junior. 

Hon. J. C. Calhoun, Vice-President of the United States. 


[Hon. John C. Calhoun to Governor Ha7n/lton.~\ 

FORT HILL, AUGUST 28, 1832. 

My Dear Sir, —I have received your note of the 31st of July, requesting me 
to give you a fuller development of my views, than that contained in my 
address last summer, on the right of a State to defend her reserved powers 
against the encroachments of the General Government. 

As fully occupied as my time is, were it doubly so, the quarter from which 
the request comes, with my deep conviction of the vital importance of the 
subject, would exact a compliance. 

No one can be more sensible, than I am, that the address of last summer 
fell far short of exhausting the subject. It was, in fact, intended as a simple 
statement of my views. I felt that the independence and candour which 
ought to distinguish one occupying a high public station, imposed a duty on 
me to meet the call for my opinion, by a frank and full avowal of my senti¬ 
ments, regardless of consequences. To fulfil this duty, and not to discuss the 
subject, was the object of the Address. But in making these preliminary 
remarks, I do not intend to prepare you to expect a full discussion on the 
present occasion. What I propose is to touch some of the more prominent 
points that have received less of the public attention, than their importance 
seems to me to demand. 



Strange as the assertion may appear, it is nevertheless true, that the great 
difficulty in determining whether a State has the right to defend her reserved 
powers against tlie General Government, or, in fact, any right at all beyond 
those of a mere corporation, is to bring the public mind to realize plain histori¬ 
cal facts, connected with the origin and formation of the Government. Till 
they are fully understood, it is impossible that a correct and just view can be 
taken of the sub ject. In this connection, the first and most important point is, 
to ascertain distinctly, who are the real authors of the Constitution of the 
United States—whose powers created it—whose voice clothed it with author¬ 
ity—and whose agent, the government it formed, in reality is. At this point, I 
commence the execution of the task which your request has imposed. 

The formation and adoption of the Constitution are events so recent, and all 
the connected facts so fully attested, that it would seem impossible that there 
should be the least uncertainty in relation to them; and yet, judging by what 
is constantly heard and seen, there are few subjects on which llie public opinion 
is more confused. The most indefinite expressions are habitually used in¬ 
speaking of them. Sometimes it is said, that the Coustitution was made by 
the States, and at others, as if in contradistinction, by the people, without 
distinguishing between the two very different meanings which may be attached 
to those general expressions; and this, not inordinary conversation, but in 
grave discussions before deliberative bodies, and in judicial investigations, 
where the greatest accuracy, on so important a ])oint might be expected; par¬ 
ticularly, as one or the other meauing is intended, conclusions the most oppo¬ 
site must follow, not only in reference to the subject of this communication, 
but as to the nature and character of our political system. By a State, may bo 
meant, either the government of a State, or the people, as forming a separate 
and independent community ; and by the people, either the American people 
taken collectively, as forming one great community, or as the people of the 
several States, forming, as above stated, separate and independent communi¬ 
ties. These distinctions are essential in the inquiry. If, by the people, be 
meant, the people collectively, and not the people of the several States taken 
separately; and, if it he true, indeed, that the Constitution is the work of the 
American people collectively—if it originated with them, and derives its 
authority from their will—then there is an end of the argument. The right, 
claimed for a State, of defending her reserved powers against the General 
Government, would be an absurdity. Viewing the American people collect¬ 
ively, as the source of political power, the rights of the States would be mere 
concessions—concessions from the common majority, and to be revoked by 
them witli the same facility that they were granted. The States would, on 
this .supposition, bear to the Union the same relation that counties do to the 
States; and it would, in that case, he just as preposterous to discuss the right 
of interposition on the part of a State against the General Government, as that 
of the counties against the States themselves. That a large portion of the 
people of the United States thus-regard the relation between the States and the 
General Government, including many who call themselves the friends of 
State Rights and opponents of Consolidation, can scarcely be doubted, as it Ls 
only on that supposition it can be explained that so many of that description 
should denounce the doctrine for which the State contends, as so absurd. 
But, fortunately, the supposition is entirely destitute of truth. So far from 
the Constitution being the work of the American people collectively, no such 
political body, either now, or ever did exist. In that character the people of 
this country never performed a single political act—nor indeed can, without 
an entire revolution in all our political relations. 

I challenge an instance. From the beginning, and in all the changes of 
political existence, through which we liave passed, the people of the United 
States have been united ns forming politic;-,! communities, and not as indt- 


4 

viduals. Even in the first stage of existence they formed distinct colonies, 
independent of each other, and politically united only through the British 
crown. In their first informal union, for the purpose of resisting the encroach¬ 
ments of the mother country, they united as distinct political communities; 
and, passing from their colonial condition, in the act announcing their 
independence to the world, they declared themselves, by name and enumera¬ 
tion, free and independent States. In that character, they formed the old 
confederation; and, when it was proposed to supersede the articles of the 
confederation, by the present Constitution, they met in Convention as Stales, 
acted aud voted as States; and the Constitution, when formed, was submitted 
for ratification to the people of the several States; it was ratified by (hem, as 
States—each Stale for itself; each, by its ratification, binding its own citizens ; 
the parts thus separately binding themselves—and not the Avhole the parts; 
to which, if it be added, that is declared in the preamble of the Constitution to 
be ordained by the people of the United States, and in the article of ratification, 
when ratified, it is declared “to be binding between the States so ratifying 
the conclusion is inevitable, that the Constitution is the work of the people of 
the States, considered as separate and independent political communitie.s— 
that they are its authors—their power created it—their voice clothed it with 
authority—that the government it formed is, in reality, their agent—and that 
the union, of which it is the bond, is an union of States, and not of individuals. 
No one who regards his character for intelligence and truth, has ever ventured 
directly to deny facts so certain; but while they are too certain for denial, they 
are also top conclusive in favour of the rights of the States, for admission. 
The usual course has been adopted: to elude what can neither be denied nor 
admitted; and never has the device been more successl'ullwpractised. By 
confounding States with State Governments, and the people of the States 
with the American people collectively, things, as it regards the subject of this 
communication, totally dissimilar, as much so as a triangle and a square, facts, 
of themselves perfectly certain and plain, and which, when well understood, 
must lead to a correct conception of the subject, have been involved in obscu¬ 
rity and mystery. 

I will next proceed to state some of the results, which necessarily follow, 
from the facts which have been established. 

The first, and in reference to the subject of this communication, the most 
important is, that there is no direct and immediate connection between the 
individual citizens of a State and the General Government. The relation 
between them is through the State. The Union is an union of States, as 
communities, and not an union of individuals. As members of a Slate, her 
citizens were originally subject to no control, but that of the State; and could 
be subject to no other, except by the act of the State itself The Constitution 
was accordingly submitted to the States for their separate ratification; and it 
was only by the ratification of the State that its citizens became subject to the 
control of the General Government. The ratification of any other, or all the 
other States, without its own, could create no connection between them and 
the General Government, nor imposemn them the slightest obligation. With¬ 
out the ratification of their own State, they would stand in the same relation 
to the General Government, as do the citizens and subjects of any foreign 
State; and we find the citizens of North-CaroHna and Rhode-Island actually 
hearing that relation to the Government for some time after it went into opera¬ 
tion ; these States having, in the first instance, declined to ratify. Nor had 
the act of any individual the least influence in subjecting him to the control of 
the General Government, except as it might influence the ratification of the 
Coustitution by his own State. Whether subject to its control, or not, de¬ 
pended wholly on the act of the State. His dissent had not the least weight 
against the assent of his State—nor his assent against its dissent. It follows. 


5 

as a necessary consequence, that the act of ratification hound the State, as 6 
coniinuuity, as is expressly declared in the article of ratification above quoted, 
and not the citizens of the State, as individuals; the latter being bound 
through their State, and in consequence of the ratification of the former. 
Another, and a highly important consequence, as it regards the subject under 
investigation, follows with equal certainty; that on a question, whether a 
particular power, exercised by the General Government, bo granted by the 
Constitution, it belongs to the State, as a member of the Union, in her sover¬ 
eign capacity, in Convention, to determine definitively, as far as her citizens 
are concerned, the extent of the obligation which she contracted ; and if, in 
lier opinion, the act exercising the power be unconstitutional, to declare it null 
and void, which declaration tcould be obligator]^ on her citizens. In coming to 
this conclusion, it may be proper to remark, to prevent misrepresentation, 
that I do not claim for a State the right to abrogate an act of the General Gov¬ 
ernment. It is the Constitution that annuls an unconstitutional act Such an 
act is, of itself, void and of no effect. What I claim is, the right of the State, 
as far as its citizens are concerned, to declare the extent of the obligation, and that 
such declaration is binding on them —a right, when limited to its citizens, flow¬ 
ing directly from the relation of the State to the Genera! Government, on the 
one side, and its citizens on the other, as already explained, and resting on the 
most plain and solid reasons. 

Passing over, what of itself might be considered conclusive, the obvious 
principle, that it belongs to the authority, which imposeJ the obli.gations to de¬ 
clare its extent, so far as those are concerned on whom the obligation is pla¬ 
ced. I shall present a single argument which, of itself, is decisive. I have 
already shewn, that there is no immediate connection between the citizens of 
a State and the General Government; and, that tiic relation between them, is 
through the State. I have also shewn, that whatever obligations were im^. 
■posed on the citizens, were imposed by the declaration of the State, ratifying 
the Constitution. A similar declaration, by the .same authority, made with 
equal solemnity, declaring the extent of the ol)'igation, must, as far as they 
are concerued, be of equal authority. I speak, of course, on tlie supposition, 
that the right has not been transferred, as it will hereafter be shewn, that it 
has not. A citizen would have no more right to question the one, than he 
would have, the other declaration. They rest on the same authority; and as 
he was bound by the declaration of his State assenting to the Constitution, 
whether he assented or dissented, so would he be equally bound, by a declara¬ 
tion defining the extent of that assent, whether opposed to, or in favour of 
‘such declaration. In this conclusion, I am .supported by analogy. The case 
of a treaty between sovereign.s is strictly analogous. There, as in this case, 
the State contracts for the citizen, or subject;—there, as in this, the obliga. 
tion is imposed by the State ; and is independen* of bis will; and there, as in 
this, the declaration of the State, determining the e.\tent of the obligation 
contracted, is obligatory on him, as much so, as the treaty itself. 

Having now, I trust, established the very important point, that the.decla¬ 
ration of a State, as to the extent of the j)Ower granted, is obligatory on its 
citizens, I shall next proceed to consider the effects of such declaration.s, in 
reference to the General Government; a question which necessarily involves 
the counideration of the relation between it and the States. It has been 
shewn, that the people of the States, acting as distinct and independent com¬ 
munities, are the authors of the Constitution, and that the General Govern¬ 
ment was organized and ordained by them to execute its powers. The Gov¬ 
ernment then, with all of its Departments, is in fact the agent of the States, 
constituted to execute their joint will, as expressed in the Const itutioh. 

In using the term agent, I do not intend to derogate, m any degree, from its 
character as a Government. It is as truly and properly a Government, ae 

1 * 



G 

are the State Governments themselves. I have applied it, simply because i< 
strictly belongs to the relation between the General Government and lht» 
States, as, in fact, it does also, to that between a State and its own govern¬ 
ment. Indeed, according to our theory, Governments are, in tlieir nature, but 
trusts, and those appointed to administer them, trinstees, or agents to execute 
the trust powers. The sovereignty resides elsewhere ; in the people; not in 
the Government; and with us, the people iriean the people of the several States 
originally formed into thirteen distinct and independent communities, and 
now into twenty-four. Politically speaking, in reference to our own system, 
ihore are no other pcoplG, The General Goverunieiit, as well as those of the 
States, is but the organ of their power; ihe latter, that of their respective 
States, through which is exercised separately that portion of power not de¬ 
legated by the Constitution, and in the exercise of which, each State has a 
local and pecuiiai interest; tne former, the joint organ of ail the States confe¬ 
derated into one general community, and through which they jointly and 
concurringly exercise the delegated powers, in which all have a common in¬ 
terest. Thus viewed, the Con.slitaiion of the United States, with the Gov¬ 
ernment which it created, is truly and strictly, the Constitution of each State, 
as much,so, as its own particular Constitution and Government, ratified by 
the same authority, in the same mode, and having, as far as its citizens are 
concerned, its powers and obligations from tlie same source, differing only in 
the aspect, under which I am considering the subject, in the pUahted faith 
of the State to its co-States, and of which, as far as its citizens are considered, 
the State, in the last resort, is the exclusive judge. 

Such, then, is the relation between the State and General Government, in 
whatever light we may consider the Constitution, whether as a compact be¬ 
tween the States, or of the nature of a legislative enactment by the joint 
and concurring authority of the States, in their high sovereignty. In what¬ 
ever light it may be viewed, I hold it as necessarily resulting, that in the casev 
of a power disputed between them, the Gov'ernment, as the agent, has no 
right to enforce its construction against the construction of the State, as one 
of the sovereign parties to the Constitution, any more, than the State Gov¬ 
ernment would have. against the people of the State, in their sovereign capa¬ 
city, the relation being the same between them. That such wouhl be the 
ca.se, between agent and principal, in the ordinary transactions of life, no 
one will doubt, nor will it be possible to assign a reason, why it is not as appli¬ 
cable to the case of government as to that of individuals. The principle in j 
fact, springs from the relation itself and is ajjplicahle to it in all its forms and j 
characters. It may, however, be proper to notice a distinction between the* 
case of a single principal and his agent, and that of several principals and 
their joint agent, which might otherwise cause some confusion. In both cases, 
as between the agent and a principal, the construction of the principal, 
whether he be a single principal, or one of several, is equally conclusive ; 
but, in the latter case, both the principal and the agent bear relation to the 
other principals, which must be taken into the estimate, in order to understand 
fully all the results, which may grow out of the contest for power between 
them. Though the construction of the principal is conclusive against the 
joint agent, as between them, such is not the case between him and his asso¬ 
ciates. They both have an equal right of construction, and it would be the 
duty of the agent to bring dhe subject before the principals to be adjusted, ac¬ 
cording to the terms of the mstrumeut of association, and of the principal to 
submit to such adjustment. In such cases, the contract itself is the law, 
which must determine the relative rights and powers of the parties to it. 
The General Government is a case of joint agency—the joint agent of the 
twenty-four sovereign States. It would be its duty, according to the princU 
pies established, in such cases, instead of attempting to enforce its construo. 



ilou, of its powers, against tliat of the States, to bring the subject before the 
States theiuseh es, in the only form, whicli according to the provisioti of the 
Constitution it can be, by a proposition to amend, in the manner prescribed in 
the instrument, to be acted on by tlrem in tlie only mode they can rightfully 
{lursue, bv expie^ssly granting, or withholding the contested power. Against 
this conclusion there can be raised but one objection, that the States have 
sunendered, or transferred the right in question If such be the fact, there 
ought to be no ditliculty in establi.shing it. 1 he grant of the powers delega¬ 
ted IS contained in a written instrument, drawn up with giealcaie, and 
adopted with the utmost deliberation. It provides, that the powers not grant¬ 
ed, are reserved to the States and the people. If it he surrendered, or trans¬ 
ferred, let then the grant be shewn, and the controversy terminated , and 
surely, it ought to he shewn, plainly and clearly shew n, before the States are 
asked to admit wdiat, if true, w'ould not only divest them of a right, which, 
under ail its lorms, belongs to the principal oves his agent, unless surreiuiered, 
but which cannot be surrendered, wil.liout in effect, and for all practical pur¬ 
poses, reversing the relation hotween them ; putting the agent in the place 
of the principal, and the p.incipal in that of the agent ; and which wmuld 
degrade the States, from the high and sovereign condition, winch they have 
ever held, under every form of their existance, 1o be mere subordinate and 
dependant corporations But instead of .sbewdng any such grant, not a pro¬ 
vision can he found in the Constitution, authorizing the General Government 
to exercise any control vhatever over a State by for-ce, by veto, by judicial pro¬ 
cess, or in any other form— a most importaril ojvissio'ii, intended, and not occu 
dental; and as will be shewn in the course of these remarks, omitted by the 
dictates of the profoundest wisdom. 

The journal and proceedings of the Convention, wdiicli formed the Con-* 
stitntion, affrivd abuodant pi'oof, that there was in that brrdy a powerful par¬ 
ty, distinguished for talents and influence, intent onobtainitrg for the Ciener- 
al Government, a grant of the very pow’er itt question, and that they at¬ 
tempted to effect this object, in all possible ways, hirt fortunately without 
success. The first pi'oject of a Constitution submitted to the Convention 
((iov. Randolph’s) embraced a p'roposition to grant power, “to negative all 
law.s contrary, in the opinion of the National Legislature, to the articles of 
the Union, or any treaty subsisting under the anthm ity of the Union; and to 
call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to 
fulfil Us duty under the articles thereof.” The next project snlmiitted 
(Charles Pinckney’s) contained a similni provision. It proi)osed, “that 
the Legislature of the United States should have the power to revise the laws 
of the several States, that may be supposed to infringe the powers exclu¬ 
sively delegated by this Constitution to Congress, and to negative and an¬ 
nul such as do.” The next was submitted by Mr. Paterson of New’Jersey, 
which provided, “if any State, or body of men in any state, shall oppose or 
prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties” (of the Union) 
“ the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the con- 
feder ated States, or so ranch thereof, as shall be necessary to enforce, or com¬ 
pel tlie obedience to such acts, or observance of such treaties.” Gen. Ham¬ 
ilton’s followed next, which provided, that “all laws of the particular States 
contrary to the Constitution, or laws of the United States, to be utterly void: 
and the better to prevent such laws being passsed, the Govenor, or Presi¬ 
dent of each State shall be appointed by the General Governm rat: and shall 
have a negative on the laws about to be passed, in the State of which he is 
Govenor, or President.” 

At a subsequent period, a proposition was moved and referred to a Com¬ 
mittee, tojprovide, that “the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend 
to all controversies between the United States, and an individual state;” and> 


8 

uta still later period, it was moved to grant power “to negative all laws passed 
by the several .states, interf'eriiigin the o[)itiioii ol'^he Legislature, witii the 
general hannony aod interest of the Union, provid d, that two tiiirds of the 
members of each house assent to the same;” wtiicli <ifter an etfectual at¬ 
tempt to commit was v^itlihrawn. 

J do not deem it nei'essary to trace thi ongh the Journals of the Convention 
the fate of these varimi • propositions. It issnlficient that they were moved 
and failed to prove conclusively, in a man'ier never to be obliterated, that the 
Convention, which framed the Cotistititntion, was opposed to granting the 
power to the General (government, iji any form, through any of its Depart¬ 
ments, legislative, executi .e or judicial, to coerce or control a State, though 
proposed in all conceivable modes, and sustained by rhe most talented and 
influential members of the body. This, one would .suppose, ought to settle 
forever the question of the surreiiderer, or transfer of the power, under con¬ 
sideration; and such in fact would be the case, were the o{)inion of a large 
portion of the community not biassed as in fact it is, by interest. A major¬ 
ity have a direct interest in enlarging the powers of the Government, and 
the interested adhere lojiowerlwith u pertinacity which liids defiance to truth, 
though sustained by evidence, as conclusive as matliematical demonstration; 
and accordingly, the advocates of the powers of the General (iovernment, 
notwithstanding the impregnable strength of the proof to the contrary, have 
boldly claimed on construction, a power, llie grant of which was so perse- 
veringly sought, nid so sternly resisted by the Convention They rest the 
claim on the provisions in the Cou.stitntion, which declare, ‘’that this Consti¬ 
tution and the lawsmade in puisuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of 
.the laud,” and that, “the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and 
equity arising under this Constitution, the law.s of the United States, and 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.” 

I do not propose to go into a minute examination of the e provisions.— 
They have been ‘ o frequently and so ably investigated, and il^has been so 
clearly shewn that they do-not warrant the assumption of the power claim¬ 
ed for the Government, that 1 do not deem it necessary. I shall therefore 
confine myself to a few detached remarks. 

I have already stated, that a di.stinct proposition w’as made to confer the 
very power in controversy on the Supreme court, which failed; which, of it¬ 
self ought to overrule the assumption of the power by construction, unless 
sustained by the most conclusive arguments; but when it is added that this pro¬ 
position was moved (20th August) subsequent to the period of adopting the 
provisions, above cited, vesting the court with its present powers, (18th Ju¬ 
ly) and that, an effort was made, at a still later period (23 August) to invest 
Congress with a negative on all state laws, which, in its opinion, might in¬ 
terfere with the general intere.st iind harmony of the Union, the argument 
would .seem too conclusive against the powers of the court, to be ovenuled 
by construction, however strong. 

Passing by, however, this, and also the objection, tlmt the terms cases in 
law and equity are technical, embracing only questions between parties, ame¬ 
nable to the process of the court, and, of course, excluding questions be¬ 
tween the States and the General Government ; an argument which 
has never been answered ; there remains another objection perfectly 
conclusive. 

The construction, which would confer on the Supreme court the power 
in question, rests on the ground, that the constitution has conferred on that 
tribunal the high and important right of deciding on the constitutionality of 
Imws. That it possessf‘.s this power, I do not deny, but I do utterly, that it 
is conferred, by the Constitution, either by the provisions above cited, or any 
Other. It is a power, derived not from the Constitution, but from the neces- 


1 ) 

sity of the case ; and so far from being possessed by the Supreme court, ex¬ 
clusively, or peculiarly, it not only belongs to every court of the country, 
high or low, civil or criminal, but to all foreign courts, before which a case 
may be brought, involving the construction of a law which may conflict with 
the provisions of the Constitution. The reason is plain. Where there are 
two sets of rules prescribed, in reference to the same subject, one by a high¬ 
er, and the other b}' an inferior authority, the judicial tribunal called in to de¬ 
cide on the case must unavoidably determine, should they conflict, winch is 
the law ; and that necessity compels it to decide, that the rule prescribed by 
the inlerior power, if, in its opinion, inconsistent with that of the higher, is 
void ; be the conflict between the constitution and a law, or between a char¬ 
ter, and the by-laws of a corporation. The primriple, and source of autho¬ 
rity are the same in both cases. Being derived from ifecessity, it is restricted 
w'ithin its limits, and cannot pass an inch beyond its narrow confuies of deci¬ 
ding in a case before the court, and of course, between parlies amenable to 
its process, excluding thereby political questions, which of the two is in re¬ 
ality, the law, the act of Congress, or the Constitution, wdien, on their face, 
they are inconsistent; and yet, from this resulting, limited power derived 
from necessity, and held in common with every court in the w orld, whit h by 
possibility may take cognizance of a case involving the interpretation 
ot our Constitution and laws, it is attempted to confer on the Supreme 
f/Onrt, a power, which would work a thorough and radical change in 
our system ; and which power was p sitively refused i>y the Conventiou. 

The opinion, that the General Governinent has the rig^ t toenforce its con- 
strnctioir of its powers against a State, iti any mode whatever is, in truth, 
founded on a misconception of our systetn. At the bottom of this, and in 
fact, almost every other inisconeeplio;;, as to the reiatio'i between the States 
and the General Government, lurks the radical error, that tl;e latter is a na¬ 
tional, and not a.s in reality it is a Confederated Government ; and that it de¬ 
rives its powers from a higher source than the States. Theie are thousands 
influenced by these impressions, without being con.scious of it, and who, 
while they believe themselves to be opposed to consolidation, have infused 
into their conception of onr Constitution, almost all the ingredients, which 
enter into (hat form of Government. '^^I'he striking diflerence between the 
present Government, and that under the old confederation (I speak of Govern¬ 
ments, ns distinct from constitutions) has mainly contributed to this dangerous 
impression. But, however disimilar their Governments, the present Consti¬ 
tution is as far removed from consolidation, and is as strictly, and as purely 
a covfederation, as the one w'hich it superseded. 

Like the Old Confederation, it was formed and ratified by State authority. 
The only difference in this particular is, that one was ratified by the people 
of the States, the other by the State Governments; one forming more strictly 
an Union of the State Governments, the other of tiuf States themselves ; one 
of the agents exercising the powers of Sovereignty, and the other of the 
Sovereigns themselves ; but both were Unions of I’olitical bodies, as distinct 
from all Union of tsic people individnally. They are, indeed, bal/i ronfedc- 
ratiovs ; but the present in a higher and purer sense, than that which it suc¬ 
ceeded ; just as the act of a sovereign, is higher and more perfect, than that 
of his agent; and it was, doubtless, in reference to this diflerence, that the 
preamble of the Constitution, and the address of the Convention, laying the 
Constitution before Congress, speak of consolidating and perfecting the 
Union ; yet this difference, which while ilelevnled the (icneral Government,, 
in relation to the State Governments, placed it more immediately in the 
relation of the creature and agent of the Stales themselves, by a natural mis¬ 
conception, has lioeu the principal cause of the impression so prevalent—of 
tlie inferiority of the State.s to the Genera! Government.and of the consequent 



ro 

right of the latter to coerce the former. Raised from below the State 
Governments, it was conceived to he placed above the States themselves. 

I have now, I trust, conclusively shown, that a State has a right, in her 
sovereign capacity, in Convention, to declare an unconstitutional act of 
Congress to be null and void, and that such declaration would be obligatory 
on her citizens, as highly so as the constitution itself, and conclusive against 
the General Government, which would have no right to enforce its construc¬ 
tion of its powers against that of the .State. 

I next propose to consider the practical ertect of the exercise of this high 
and important right, w^hich, as the great conservative principle of our sys¬ 
tem, is known under the various names of Nullification, Interposition, and 
State Veto, in reference to its operation, viewed under diU'erent aspects.— 
Nullification, as annulling an u.nconstitutional act of the General Govern¬ 
ment, as far as the State is foncerned; Interposition, as throwing the shield 
of protection between the citizens of a State, and the encroachments of the 
Government; and Veto, as arresting or inhibiting its unauthorised acts within 
the limits of the State. 

The practical eftect, could the right be considered as one fully recognized, 
would be plain and simple, and has already in a great measure been antici¬ 
pated. If the State has a right, there must of necessily be a corresponding 
obligation on the part of the General Government, to acquiesce in its exer¬ 
cise ; and of course it would be its duty to abandon the power, at least as far 
as the iState is concerned, and to apply to the States themselves, according to 
the form prescribed in the Constitution, to obtain it by a grant. If granted, 
acquiescence then would be a duty on the part of the State, and in that event, 
the contest would terminate in converting a doubtful constructive power, in¬ 
to one positively granted; but should it not be granted, no alternative would 
remain for the General Government but its permanent abandonment. In 
either event, the controversy would be closed, and the Constitution fixed ; a 
result of the utmost importance to the steady operation of the Government, 
and the stability of the system, and which can never be attained under its 
present operation, without the recognition of the right, as experience has 
sliewn. 

From the adoption of the Constitution, we have had but one continued 
agitation of constitutional questions, embracing some of the most important 
powers exercised by the (government; and yet, in spite of all the ability and 
force of argument displayed in the various discussions, backed by the high 
authority claimed for the Supreme Court, to adjust such controversies, not 
a single constitutional question, of a political character, which has ever been 
agitated, during this long period, has been settled, in the public opinion, 
except that of the unconstitiuionality of the Alien and Sedition Law; and, 
what is remarkable, that was settled against the, decision of the Supreme Court. 
The tendency is to inerSase, and not diminish this conflict for power. New 
questions are yearly added, without diminishing the old, while the contest 
becomes more obstinate as the list increases; and. what is highly ominous 
more sectional. It is impossible that the Government can last, under this 
increasing diversity of opinion, and growing uncertainty, as to its power, 
m relation to the most important subjects oflegislation; and equally so, that 
this dangerous state can terminate, without a power somewhere to compel, 
in eftect, the Government to abandon doubtful constructive powers, or to 
convert them into positive grants, by an amendment of t'le Constitution ; in 
a word, to substitute the positive grants of the parties themselves, for tlie 
constructive powers interpolated by the agents Nothing short of this, in a 
system constructed as ours is. with a double set of agents, one for local, and 
the other for general purposes, can ever terminate the conflict for power, of 
give uniformity and stability to its action. 



11 

Such would be the practical and happy operation were the right recognized; 
but the case may be far otherwise; and as the right is not only denied, but 
violently opposed the General Government, so I’ar from accptiescing in its 
exercise, and abandoning the power, as it ought, may endeavor, b} all the 
means within its connnand. to enforce its construction against that of the 
State. It is under this aspect of the question, that I now propose to consi¬ 
der the practical eftect of the exercise oftlie right with the view to determine, 
which of the two, the State or the General Government, mu.st prevail in 
the conflict; which compels UiC to revert to some of the grounds already 
established. 

I have already shewm, that the declaration of Nullification would be obli- I 
gatory on the citizens of the State, as much so in fact, as its declaration ra- \ 
tifying the Constitution, resting as it does, on the same basis. It would to 
them be the highest possible evidence, that the power contested was not 
granted, and, of course, that the act of the G neral Government was uncon¬ 
stitutional. They would be bound, in all the relations of life, private and 
political, to respectand obey it; and, when called upon, as Jurymen, to ren¬ 
der their verdict accordingly, or as Judges, to pronounce judgment in con¬ 
formity to it. Ihe right ot Jury trial is secured by the ('onstitutioii (thanks 
to the jealous spirit of liberty doubly secured and forlifu d) and with this in¬ 
estimable right—inestimable, not only as an essential portion of the judicial 
tribunals of the country, but infinitely more so, considered as a popular, and 
still more, a local representation, in that deiiartmeut of the Government, 
wliich, without it, would be the farthest removed from the control of the 
people ; and a fit instrument to sap the foundation of the system ; with, 1 re¬ 
peat, this inestimable right, it would be impossiide for the general govern¬ 
ment, within the limits of the State, to execute, legally, the act nullified, or 
any other, passed with a view'to enforce it; w'hile on the other hand, the 
State would be able to enforce, legally and peaceably, its declaration of Nul¬ 
lification. Sustained by its Court and Juries, it would calmly and quietly, 
but successfully, meet every effort of the General Government to enforce its 
claim of power. The result would be inevitable. Before the judicial tri¬ 
bunals of the country, the State must prevail ; unless, indeed, Jury 
trial could be eluded, by the refinements of ihe court, or by some 
other device ; which, however, guarded as it is by the ramparts of the 
Constitution, would, I hold, be impossible. The attempt to elude, 
should it be made, would itself be unconstitutional ; and, in turn, would 
be annulled by the sovereign voice of the State. Nor would the right 
of appeal to the Supreme Court, under the Judiciary act, avail the General 
Government. If taken, it would but end in a new trial, and that, in ano¬ 
ther verdict against the government; but whether it may be taken, would 
be optional with the State. The (iiourt itself has decided, that a copy of the 
record is requisite to review a Judgment of a State Court; and, if necessary, 
the State would take the precaution to prevent, by proper enactments, any 
means of obtaining a copy. But if obtained, what would it avail, against the 
execution of the penal enactments of the State, intended to enforce the de¬ 
claration of Nullification? The Judgement of the State Court would be 
pronounced and executed, before the possibilty of a reversal; and executed 
too, without responsibility incurred by any one. 

Beaten before the courts, the General Government would be compelled to 
abandon its unconstitutional pretensions, or resort to force—a reso> t, the dif¬ 
ficulty (I was about to say, the impossibility) of which, would very soonfully 
manifest itself, should folly, or madness, ever make the attempt. 

In considering this aspect of the controversy, I pass over the fact, that the 
General Government has no right to resort to force against a state—to coerce 
a sovereign member of the Union—which, I trust, I have established beyond 


12 

all possible doubt. Let it, however, be deternuued to use force, and the dif- 
licnlty would be insurmountable, unless, indeed, i! be also determined to set 
aside the Constitution, and to subvert the system to its foundations. 

Against whom would it l)e applied? Congress lias, d is true, the right to 
call forth the militia, “to execute the jaws, and suppress insurrections;” but 
there would be no law resisted, unless, indeed, it be called resi'stauce for the 
juries to refuse to find, and the courts to render judgment, in conformity to 
the wishes of the General Government; no insurrection to suppress; no 
armed force to reduce; not a sword unsheathed ; not a bayonet raised; tionc, 
absolutely none, on whom force could be used; except it be on the unarmed 
citizens engaged peaceably and quietly, in their daily occupations. 

• No one would be guilty of treason, (“levying war against the United States, 
adhering to their enemies; giving them aid and comfort,”) or any other 
crime, made penal by the Constitution, or the laws of the United States. 

To suppose that force could be called in, implies, indeed, a great mistake, 
both as to the nature of our Government and that of the comrover.sy. It 
would be a legal and constitutional contest, a coufiict of moral, and not phy¬ 
sical force—a trial of constitutional, not military power, to be decided before 
the judicial tribunals of the country, and noton the field of battle. In sjich 
contest, there would be no object for force, but those peaceful tribunals—no¬ 
thing on which it could be employed, hut in putting down courts and juries, 
and preventing the execution of judicial process. Leave these untouched, 
and all the militia that could be called forth, hacked by a regular force of ♦en 
times the number of our small but gallant and patriotic army, could not have 
the slightest effect on the result of the controversy; but subvert these by an 
armed body, and you subvert the very foundation of this, oiir free, constitu¬ 
tional and legal system of government, and rear in its place a militaiy des¬ 
potism. 

Feeling the force of these difficulties, it is proposed with the view, I sup¬ 
pose, of disembarrassing the operation as much as possible of the trcnblesome 
interference of courts and juries, to change the scene of coercion from land 
to water, as if the Government could have one particle more right to coerce 
ti state by water than by land; but unless I am greatly deceived, the difficulty 
on that element will not be much less than on the other The jury trial, at 
least the local jury, (the trial by the vicinage) may indeed, be evaded there ; 
but, in its place, other and not much less formidable obstacles must be en¬ 
countered. 

There can be but two modes of coercion resorted to by water, blockade, 
and abolition of the ports of entry of the State, accompanied by penal enact¬ 
ments, anthori.sing seizures for entering the waters of the State If the for¬ 
mer be attempted, there will be other parties, besides the General Govern¬ 
ment and the .'^tat.e. Blockade is a belligerent right. It presupposes a .state 
of war, and, unless there be war (war in due form, as prescribed by the Con¬ 
stitution.) the order for blockade would not be respected by other riations, or 
their subjects. Their vessels would proceed directly for the blockaded port, 
with certain prospects of gain; if seized under the order of blockade, through 
the claim of indemnity against the General Government; and, if not, by a 
profitable market without the exaction of duties. 

The other mode, the abolition of the ports o^ entry of the States, would 
also have its difficulties. The Constitution provides that “no preference 
shall be given by any regulation'of commerce, or revenue, to the ports of 
one State, over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one 
State be obliged to enter, clear, or pav duties in another;” provisions? too 
clear to be elufled even bv the force of construction. There will be another 
difficulty. If-eiznres he made in port or within the distance assigned by 
Che laws of nations, as the limits of a Stale, the trial must be in the State, 



IS 

with all the embarrassments of its courts ami ju its wmle beyond the ports 
vind the distaiice to which 1 have referred, it would be dilficult to point out 
any principle by which a foreign vessel at least, could be seized, except as an 
incident to the right of blockade, and of course, with all the difficulties be' 
longing to that inode of coercion. 

But, there yet remains another, and, I doubt not. insuperable barrier, to be \ 
found in the judicial tribunals of the Union, against all the schemes of intro¬ 
ducing force, whether by laud or water.—Though I cannot concur in the 
opinion uf those who regard the Supreme Court as llie mediator, appointed 
by the Coiustitiition, between tlic State.s and the General Governnient; and i 
though I cannot doubt tiiere is a natural bias on its part, towards the powers * 
of the latter, yet I must greatly lower my. opinion of that high and impor¬ 
tant tribunal, for intelliiience, justice ,and attachment to the Constitution, 
and particularly of that pure and upright: Magistrate, who has so long, and 
with such disfuigiiished honor to himself and the Union, presided over its de¬ 
liberations, w i h all the weight that belongs to an intellect of the first order, 
ujiited witli the most spotless in'.egrity, to believe for a moment, that an at¬ 
tempt, so plainly and manifesiiy nnconstitntionai, as a resort to'force would 
be, in sjicli a contest, could lie sustained by the sanction of its authority. In 
whatever form force may ho used, it must present questions for legal adjudi- 
ciation. If in the shape of lilockade, the vessels seized under it, must be 
eomleiuned, and thus would he presented the question of prize or no prize, 
and. with it, tlie legality of the l)lucl<ade; if, in that of a repeal of the acts, 
establishing ports of entries in the Stale, the legality of the .seizure must be 
determined, and that wunild bring up the question of the constitutionality of 
giving a i)referencc to the ports of one State over those of another; and, so, 
if we pass from water to land, vve will find every attempt there, to substitute 
force for law, must in like manner, come under the rev.iew' oflhe Courts ofthe 
Union,and the unconstitutionality would he so glaring,that the Execuliveand 
I.egislalive Departments, in their attempt to coerce, should either make an at¬ 
tempt, solawles.s and desperate, would be without the supjiort of the Judicial 
Department. I will not pursue tlie question further, as I hold it perfectly clear, 
that so long as a State retains its Federal relations, so long, in a w’ord, as it 
continues a member of the Union the contest between it and the General 
Government must be before the Co’urts and Juries, and every attempt, in what¬ 
ever form, whether by land, or water, to substitute force as the arbiter, in 
their place, must fail. Tlie unconstitutionality of the attempt would be so 
open and palpable, that it would he impossible to sustain it. 

There is indeed one view, and one only of the contest, in which force could 
he employed ; hut that view, as between tlie parties, would supersede the 
('onstirntion itself; that Nuilificati m is secession, and would, consequently, 
j)Iace the State, as to the others, in the relation of a foreign State. Such 
clearly would be the efi'ect of seces.sion; hut it is equally clear, that it would 
place the State beyond the pale of all her Federal relations, and, thereby, all 
control on the part of the other States over her. She would stand to them 
simply in the relation of a foreign State, divested (>f all Federal connection, 
and having none other between them, but those belonging to the laws of 
nations. Standing thus towards one another, force might indeed be employed 
against a State, but it must be a belligerent force, preceded by a declaration 
o'? war, and carried on with all its formalities. Such would be the certain 
effect of secession ; and if Nullification he Secession—if it he hut a different 
name for the same thing—such t(»o, must be its effect; which presents the 
higldy important question, are they, in fact the same, on the decision of 
which, depends the question, whether it be a peaceable and ccnstittitional 
remedy, that may be exerci-sed without terminating the Federal relations of 
the Stale, or not. 



14 

I an) aware, that there is a considerable, and respectable portion oi' our 
State, with a very large portion of the Union, constituting in fact, a great ma¬ 
jority! who are of the opinion, that they are the same thing, ditleiing only in 
name; and who, under that impression, denounce it, as the most dangerous 
of all doctrines; and yet, so far from being the same, they are, unless indeed 
I am greatly deceived, not only perfectly distinguishable, but totally dissimilar 
in their nature, their object, and effect; and that, so far from deserving the 
denunciation, so properly belonging to the act, with which it is confounded, 
it is, in truth, the highest and most precious of all the rights of the States, 
and essential to preserve that very Union, for the supposed effect of destroy¬ 
ing which, it is so bitterly anathematized. 

I shall now proceed to make good my assertion of their total dissimilarity. 

First, they are wholly dissimilar in their nature. One has reference to the 
parlies thcnisdccs, and the other to their agents. Secession is a vithdraical 
from the Union; a separation from ’partners, and, as far as depends on the 
member withdrawing, a dissolution of the partnership. It presupposes an 
association ; a Union of several States, or individiuils, for a common object. 
Wherever these exist, Secession may ; ami where tiiey do not, it cannot. 
i\ullification on the contrary, presupposes the relation of principal and agent; 
tlie one granting a power to be executed, tl’e other, appointed by him, with 
authority to execute it; and is simply a declaration on the pari of the principal, 
made in due form, that an act of the agent, iranscending his power is null and 
Toid. It is a right belonging exclusively to llie relation lielween jn incipal and 
agent, to be found icherever it exists, and in all Us forms, iietween several, oi 
an association of principals, and their joint agents, as well as between a sin¬ 
gle priueijm! and his agent. 

“ The difference in their object is no less striking than in their nature. 

The object of Secession is to free the withdrawing member from the ohliga- 
tion of the association, or union; and is applicable to cases, wliere the inten¬ 
tion of the association, or union has failed, either by an abuse of power on tlie 
part of its members, or other causes. Its direct and inrnicdiate object, as it con¬ 
cerns the u'ilhdrawing memher, is the dissolution of the association or union. 
On the contrary the object of Nullification is to confine the agent within the 
limits of his powers, by arresting bis acts, tran.sceiiding them; not tcith the 
view of destroying the delegated or trust power, but to preserve it, by compelling 
the agent to fulfil the object for which the agency, or trust teas created; and is 
applicable o)ily to cases where the trust or delegated powers are transcended on 
the part of the agent. Without the power of Secession, an as.sociation, or 
union, formed for the common good of ail the members, might prove ruinous 
to some, by the abuse of power, on the part of the others; and without Nul¬ 
lification, the agent might under colour of construction, assume a power never 
intended to bo delegated, or to convert those delegated, to objects never in¬ 
tended to be comprehended in the trust, to the ruin of the principal, or, in 
case of ajoint agency, to the ruin of some of tiie principals. Each has llms, 
its appropriate object; but objects in their nature, very di.ssimilar; so much 
so. that in case of an association or union, where the powers are delegated to 
be executed by an agent, the abuse of power, on the part of the agent to tlie 
injury of one or more of the members, would not justify Secession, on their 
part. The rightful remedy in that case would be Nullification. There would 
be neither right, nor pretext to secede; not right, because secession is appli¬ 
cable only to the acts of the membeVsof the association or union, and not to 
the act of the agent: nor pretext, because there is another, and equally effi¬ 
cient remedy, short of the dissolution of the association or union, which cau 
only be justified by necessity. Nullification may, indeed, be succeeded by 
•Secession. In the case staled should the other members undertake to grant 
t he‘power nullified, aitd should the nature of the power be such as to defeat 
ticobiect of the association or tinmi, at least, as far as the member nullifying 




i.-A concerned, it would then become an abuse of power on the part of the prin 
cipnls : and thus present a case, where secession would apply ; but in no 
other, could it be justihed, except it be for a failure of the association or 
union, to elfect tiie object for which it was created, independent of any abuse 
of power. 

It now remains to shev\% that their effect is as dissimilar, as their nature, or 
object. 

NuHilication leaves the members of the association, or union, in the condi¬ 
tion it found them, subject to all its burdens, and entitled to all its advantages, 
comprehending the member nullifying, as well as the others ; its object being, 
not to destroy, but to preserve, as has. been stated. It simply arrests the act 
of the agent, as far as the principal is coucenicd. leaving in every other res¬ 
pect, the operation of the joint concern, as before ; Secession on the contrary, 
destroys, as far as the withdrawing member is concerned, the association, or 
union, and restores him to the relation he occupied towards the other mem¬ 
bers before the existence of the association or union. He loses the benefit, 
but is released from the burden and control; and can no longer be dealt with 
by his former associates, as one of its members. 

Such are clearly the differences between them—differences so marked, 
that instead of being identified, as supposed, they form a contrast, in all the 
aspects in which they can be regarded. The application of these remarks 
to the political as.sociation, or Union of these twenty-four States, and the 
tGeneral Government, their joint agent, is too obvious, after what has been 
already said, to require any additional illustration ; and I will dismiss this part 
of the subject, with a single additional remark. 

There are many, who acknowledge the right of a State to secede, but 
deny its right to nullify; and yet, it seems impossible to admit the one, with¬ 
out admitting the other. They both presuppose the same structure of the 
Government, that it is a union of the States as forming political communi¬ 
ties, the same right on the part of the States, as members of the Union, to 
determine for lier citizens, the extent of the powers delegated and those re¬ 
served, and, of course, to det ide whether the constitution has or has not. 
been violated. The simple ddference then, between those wdio admit Seces¬ 
sion, and deny Nullification, a.id (liose who admit both, is, that one acknowl¬ 
edges, that the declaration of a Slate, pronouncing that the Constitution has 
been violated, and is tlierefoic, null and void, would be obligatory on her 
citizens, and would arrest all the acts of the Government, within the limits 
of the State ; while they deny that a similar declaration, made by the same 
authority, and in the same manner, that an act of the Government has tran¬ 
scended its powers, and that it is, therefore, null and void, would have any 
obligation, while the other acknowledges the obligation in both cases. The 
one admits that the declaration of a State assenting to tlie Constitution 
bound her citizens, and that her declaration can unbind them ; but denies, 
tliat a similar declaration, as to the extent, she has in fact bound them, has 
anyobligatory force on them ; while the other gives equal force to the declar¬ 
ation in the several cases. The one denies the obligation, where the object 
is to preserve the Union in the only way it can be, by confining the Government, 
formed to execute the trust powers, strictly within their limits, and to the 
objects, for which they were delegated, though they give full force, where 
the object is to destroy the Union itself; while the other, in giving equal 
weight to both, prefers the one because it preserves, and rejects the other because 
it destroys ; and yet, the former is the Union ; and the latter the Disunion 
party ! And all this strange distinction originates as far as I can judge, in 
atlrilmting to Nullification, what belongs exclusively to Secession. The difii- 
c.uUy, as to the former, it seems is, that a State cannot be in and out of the' 
Union at the same tinio. 


lij 

Tills is, isideiid, true, il’ap|died to j^ecc.ssitin—Ihe throivin^ olF the aidiiortiy 
of the Union itself. To nullify the Constitution, if I may be jiardoiied the 
solecism, would indeen be tantamount to disunion; and as applied to such an 
act, it would be true that a State could not be in and out of the Union at the 
same time ; but the act would be Secession. 

But to apply it to Nullification, properly understood, the object of which, 
instead of resisting or diminishing the power.s of the Union, is to preserve 
them as they are, neither increased nor diminished, and thereby the Union 
itself (for the Union may be as effectiially destroyed by increasing as by 
diminishing its powers—by Consolidation a.s by disunion itself} would be, f 
would say, had I not great respect for mg,ny who do thus apply it, egregious 
trifling with a grave and deeply important constitutional subject. 

I might here finish the task which your request imposed; having, I trust, 
demonstrated, beyond the power of refutation, that a State lias the right to 
defend her reserved powers, against the encroachments oftlie (ienoral Gov¬ 
ernment; and, I may add, that the right is in its nature peaceable, consistent 
with the federal relatioQs of the State, and perfectly etlicieut, whether con¬ 
tested in the Courts, or attempted to be resisted by Ibrce. But there is 
another aspect of the subject, not yet touched, widiout adverting to which, it 
is impossible to undorstaiid the full effects of Nulhflcatiou, or the real charac¬ 
ter of our political institutions; I allude to the power which the States, as a 
confederated body, liave acquired directly over each other; and on which 
will now proceed to make some remarks, tiiough I fear at the hazard of 
fhtiguing you. 

Previous to the adoption of the pi«aent Constitution, no power could he 
■J exercised over any State, by any other, or all of the States, without its own 
• consent; and we, accordingly, find, that the old Confederation and the pre¬ 
sent Constitution were both submitted for ratification to each of the States, and 
that each ratified for itself, and was bound only in consequence of its own 
particular ratification, as has been already stated. The present Constitution has 
made in this particular, a most important modification in their condition. I allude 
to the provision which gives validity to amendments of the Constitution, when 
ratified by three-fourtlis of the States—a provision which has not attracted as 
much attention as it importance deserves. Without it, no cliange could have 
been made in the Constitution, unless with the unanimous consent of all the 
States, in like manner as it was adopted. This provision, then, contains a 
highly important concession, by each to all of the States, of a portion oftlie 
original and inherent right of self-government, possessed, previously by each 
separately, in favour of their general confederated powers, giving, theneby, 
increased energy to the States in their united capacity, and weakening them 
in the same degree in their separate. Its object was to facilitate and strengthen 
the action oftlie amending, or (to speak a little more appropriately a^ it re¬ 
gards the point under consideration) the repairing power. It was-foreseen, * 
that experience would probably disclose errors in the Constitution itself—that 
time would make groat changes in tlie condition of the country, wliich would 
require corresponding changes in the Constitution—that the irregular and con¬ 
flicting movemonts of the bodies, composing sj complex a system, might 
cause derangements requiring correction—and that to require the unanimous 
consent of ull the States to meet these various coutingences, would be placing 
the whole too much under the control oftlie parts; to remedy which, this 
great additional power was given to the amending or repairing power—this 
ris medicatrix of the system. 

To understand, correctly, the nature of this concession, we must not con¬ 
found it with the delegated powers, conferred on the General Government, 
and to be exercised by it, as the joint agents of the States. They are essemially 
diflerent. The former is, in fact, but a modification oftlie original sovereign 


17 

power, re?i(lin" iii the people oftho several States— o\'the creating or Cunsti- 
tlition-mafciug power itsdf, intended, as stated, to facilitate and strengthen its 
artlon, and not change its character. Though modified, it is not delegated. It 
still resides in the States, and is still to be exercised by them, and not by the Got- 
crnnient. 

1 propose next, to consifler tliis important modification of the sovereign 
powers ot the States, in connexion witli the right of Nullification. 

It is acknowledged, on all sides, that the duration and stability df our sys¬ 
tem depends on maintaining the equilibrium between the States and the Gen¬ 
eral Government—the reserved and delegated powers. We know, that the 
Convention which Ibrmed the Constitution, and the various State Conven¬ 
tions which adopted it, as far as we are informed of their proceedings ^ 
tfclt the deepest solicitude on this point. They saw and felt there would be 
an incessant conflict between them, which would menace the existence of the 
system itself, unless properly guarded. The contest between the States and 
(ieneral Government—the reserved and delegated rights—willj in truth, be a 
conflict between the great predominant interests of the Union, on one side, 
controlling and directing the movements of the Government, and seeking to en¬ 
large the delegated powers, and thereby advance their power and prosperity; 
and, on the other, the minor interests rallying on the reserved powers, as the 
Oiily means of protecting themselves against the encroachment and oppression 
of the other. In such a contest, without the most effectual check, the stronger 
will absorb the weaker interests: while, on the other hand, without an ade¬ 
quate provision of some description, or other, the efforts of the weaker to 
guard against the encroachments of the stronger, might permanently derange 
the system. 

On the side of the reserved powers, no check more effectual can be found, 
or desired, than Nullification, or the right of arresting, within the limits of a 
State, the exercise, by the General Government, of any powers, but the dele¬ 
gated—a right which (if the States bo true to themselves, and faithful to the 
Constitution) w’ill ever prove, on the side of the reserved powers, an effectual 
protection to both. 

Nor is the check on the side of tlie delegated, less perfect. Though less 
strong it is an ample guard against encroachments; and is as strong as the nature 
of the system will bear, as will appear in the sequel. It is to be found in the 
amending power. Without the modification, which it contains of the rights of 
self-government, on the part of the States, as already explained, the consent 
ofeach State would have been requisite to any additional grant of power, or 
other amendment of the Constitution. While, then. Nullification would ena¬ 
ble a State to arrest the exercise of a power not delegated, the right of self-go* 
i'efnmeiit, if nnmodifieil, would enable her to prevent the grant of a power not 
delegated; and, thus, her conception of what power ought to be granted^ 
would be as conclusive, against the eo-States, as her construction of the pow¬ 
ers granted, is against the General Government. In that cjise, the dangcf 
would be on the side of the States, or reserved powers. The amending povV* 
er, in effect, corrects this danger. In virtue of the provisions, which it con* 
tains, the resistance of a State, to a power cannot finally prevail, unle.ss she 
be sustained bv one fourth of tlie co-States; and, in the same degree, that hcf 
resistance is weakened, the power of the General Government, or the side of 
the delegated powers, is strengthened. It is true, that yhe right of a State to 
arrest an unconstitutional act is, of itself, complete against the Government; 
hut it is equally so, that the controversy may in effect, he terminated agaimst 
her, by a grant of the contested powers, by three fourths of the States. It is 
thus, by this simple, and apparently incidental contrivance the right of 6 
State to nullify an unconstitutional act, so essential to the protection of the 
reserved rights, bat which, anchecked, might too hmteh debilitate the Got'ern* 

o* 


38 

jnent, is counterpoised, not by weakening the energy ol'a State in her direct 
resistance to the encroachment of the Government, or by giving to the latter 
a direct control over the Stales, as proposed in the Convention, but in a man¬ 
ner infinitely more safe, and, if I may be permitted so to express myselt, sci¬ 
entific, by strengthening the amending, or repairing power—the [lovver of 
correcting all abuses or derangements by whatever cause, or from whatever 
quarter. 

To sum all in a few words. The General Government has the right in 
the first instance of construing its own powers, which, if final and conclu'^ive, 
as is supposed by many would have placed the reserved powers at the mercy 
of the delegated; and. thus, destroy the equilibrium of the system. Against 
that, a Stale has the right of Nullification. This right on the part of the State, 
if not counterpoised, might tend too strongly to weaken the General Govern¬ 
ment and derange the system. To correct this, the amending, or repairing 
power is strengthened. The former cannot be made too strong, if the latter 
be proportiouably so. The increase of the latter is, in effect, the decrease of 
the former. Give to a majority ofthe Stales the right of amendment, and the 
arresting power, on the part of the Slate, would in fact be annulled. The 
amending power and the powers ofthe Government would, in that case, be, in 
reality, in the same hands. The same majority that controlled the one, would 
the other; and the power arrested, as not granted, would be immediately re¬ 
stored, in the shape of a grant. This modification ofthe right of self-govern¬ 
ment, on the part ofthe States, is, in fact, the pivot ofthe system. By shift¬ 
ing its position, as the preponderance is on the one side or the other, or, to 
drop the similie, by inc:easing, or diminishing the energy of the repairing 
power, effected by diminishing or increasing the number of States necessary 
to amend the Constitution, the equilibrium between the reserved and the de¬ 
legated rights may be preserved, or destroyed at pleasure. 

I am aware, it is objected, tiiat according to tliis view, one .fourth of the 
States may in reality change the Constitution, and, thus, take away powers, 
which have been unanimously granted by all tlie States. The objection is 
more specious than solid. The right of a State is not to resume delegated 
powers, but toprevevt Xhe reserved from being assumed by the Government. 
It is, however, certain, the right may lie abused, and, thereby, powers be re¬ 
sumed, which were in fact delegated ; and it is also true, if sustained by oue 
fourth ofthe co-States, such resumption may be successfully and permanentlv 
made by the Stale, This i.^the danger ; and the utnio.^t extent ofthe danger, 
from the side of the reserved powers. It would, 1 acknowledge, be desirable 
to avoid or lessen it; but neither can he etfected, without increasing a greater 
and imposing danger. 

If the right be denied to the State to defend her reserved powers, for fear 
she might resume the delegated, that denial would, in etlect, yield to the Gene¬ 
ral Government the power, under the colour of construction, to assume, at 
pleasure, all the reserved powers. It is, in fact, a question between the dan¬ 
ger ofthe States resuming the delegated powers, on one side, and the Gene¬ 
ral Government assuming the reserved on the other. Passing over the far 
greater probability of the latter, than the former, which I endeavoured to illus¬ 
trate in the Addre.ss of last summer, I shall confine my remarks to the striking 
difference between them, viewed in connection with the genius and theory of 
our Government. 

^ The right of a State, originally, to complete self-government is a fundamen¬ 
tal principle in our system, in virtue of which, the grant of power required the 
consent of all the States, tchile to teithhold power the dissent of a single State was 
sufficient. It is true, that this original and absolute power of self-government 
has been modified by the Constitution, as already stated, so that three-fourths 
af the States may now grant power, and consequently it requires more than 
■2>ne fourth to withhold. The boundary befween the reserved and the dele 


19 

gated powers marks tlie limits oftne Union. The .States are united to the ejt* 
tent of the latter and separated beyond that limit. It is, then, clear that it was 
not intended, that the States should be more united, than the will of one fourth 
of them, or rather one more than a fourth would permit. It is ivorthy of re¬ 
mark, that it was proposed in the Convention to increate the confederative 
power, as it may be called, by vesting two thirds of the States with the right 
of amendment; so as to require more than a third instead of a fourth, to with¬ 
hold power. The proposition was rejected; and three-fourths unanimously 
adopted. It is, Xhftn, more fu)Stile to the 7iatiire of our systcin, to assume powers 
not dele anted, than to resume those that are; and less hostile, that a State, sustain¬ 
ed by one fourth of her co-Slatcs, should prevent the exercise of potcer really in¬ 
tended. to be granted, than that the General Government should assume the exer¬ 
cise ofpowci's not intended lobe delegated. In the latter case, the usurpation of 
power would be against the fundamental principle of our sy.stem, the original 
right of the States to self-government; while in the former, if it be usurpation 
at all, it would be, if so bold an expression may be used, an usurpation in the 
spirit of the (^on.stitution itself—the spirit ordaining that the utmost extent of 
our Union should be limited by the will of any number of States, exceeding 
a fourth, and tliat most w'isely. In a country having .so great a diversity of ? 
geographical and political interests, with so vast a territory to be filled in a 
short time with almost countless millions,—a country, of which the parts \vill I 
equal Empires,—an union, more intimate than that ordained in the Constitute ^ 
on, and so intimate, of course, that it rnigh* be permanently hostile to the * 
feelings of more than a fourth of the States, instead of strengthening, would 
have exposed the system to certain destruction. There is a deep and profound \ 
philo.sophy, which he, who best knows our nature, will the most highly appre¬ 
ciate, that would make the intensity of the Union, if I may so express myself, 
inversely to the extent of territory and the population of a country, and the di¬ 
versity of its interests geographical and political, and w'hich w’ould hold, in 
deeper dread, the assumption of reserved rights, by the agent appointed to ex¬ 
ecute the delegated, than the resumption of the delegated, by the authority 
which granted the power.? and ordained the agent to administer them. There 
appears indeed, to be a great prevailing principle, that tends to place the dele- f 
gated power in opposition to the delegating; the created to the creating i 
power—reaching far beyond man and his works, up to the universal source 
of all power. The earliest pages of sacred history record the rebellion of 
the Archangels against the high authority of Heaven itself, and ancient my¬ 
thology, the war of the Titans against Jupiter, which according to its narrative, 
menaced the universe with de.struction. This all pervading principle is at 
work in our .system—the created warring against the creating power, and un¬ 
less the Government be bolted and chained down, with links of adamant, by 
the hands of the States which created it, the creature will usurp the place of 
the creator, and universal political idolatry overspf^ad the land. 

If the views pre.sented be correct, it follow.s, that on the interposition of a 
State, in favour of the reserved rights, it would be the duty of the General 
Government to abandon the contested power, or to apply to the States them¬ 
selves. the source of ail political authority, for the power, in one, of the two 
modes prescribed in the Constitution. If the case be a simple one, embracing 
a single power, and that in its nature, easily adjusted, the mqre ready and appro¬ 
priate mode, woa.a oe an amendment of the ordinary form, on a proposition of 
two-thirds of both houses of Congress, to be ratified by three-fourths of the 
States; but, on the contrary, should the derangement of the .system be great, 
embracing many points dilficult to adjust, the States ought to be convened in 
General Convention; the most august of all assemblies, representing the united 
sovereignty of the Confederated States, and having power and authority to 
correct every error, and to repair every dilapidation or injury, whether caused 
by time or accident, or the conflicting movement of the bodies, which com- 



20 

pose the system. With institutions every way so fortunate, possessed of means 
so well calculated to prevent disorders, and so admirable to correct them, when 
they cannot be prevented, he who would prescribe for our political disease, 
disunion, on the one side, or coercion of a State, in the assertion of its rights, 
on the other, tcoidd deserre, and will receive the execrations of this and all fu¬ 
ture generations. 

I have now finished what I had to say on the subject of this communication, 
in its immediate connection with the Constitution. In the discussion, I have 
advanced nothing but on the authority of the Constitution itself, or that of re¬ 
corded unquestionable facts, connected with the liistory of its origin and for¬ 
mation; and have made no deduction, biitsucii as rested on principles, which 
I believe to be unquestionable ; but it would be idle to expect, in the present 
state of the public mind, a favorable recejition of tU« conclusions, to which I 
have been carried. There are too many misconceptions to eaconnter, too 
many prejudices to combat, and above all, too gieat a weight of interest to 
resist. I do not propose to investigate these great impediments to the reception 
of the truth, though it would be an interesting subject of inquiry to trace them 
to their cause, and to measure the force of their impeding power; but there is one 
among them of so marked a character, and which operates so extensively, that 
I cannot conclude without making it the subject of a few remarks, particularly 
as they will be calculated to throw much light, on what has already bpen said. 

Of all the impediments, opposed to a just conception, of the nature of our 
political system, the impression, that llie right of a State to arrest an unconsti¬ 
tutional act of the General Government is inconsistent with the great and 
fundamental principle of all free Slates, that a majority has a right to govern, 
is tlio greatest. Tims regarded Nullification is, without further reflection, de¬ 
nounced as the most dangerous and monstrous of all political heresies, as in 
truth it would be, were the objection, as well founded, as, in fact, it is destitute 
of all foundation, as I shall now proceed to shew. 

Those who make the objection seem to suppose that the right of a majority 
to govern, is a principle too simple to admit of any distinction ; and yet, if I 
do not mistake, it is susceptible of the most important distinction—entering 
deeply into the construction of our system, and, I may add, into that of all 
free States, in proportion to tlie perlection of their institutions, iuid is essential 
to the very existence of liberty. 

When, then, it is said, that a majority ha.s the right to govern, there are two 
modes of estimating the majority, to eitlier of wliich the expression is applica¬ 
ble. The one, in which the whole commamty is regarded in the aggregate, 
and the majority i.s estimated in rtfereuce to the entire mass. This "may be 
■called the majority of the whole, or the absolute majority. The other, in 
which it is regarded in reference to its political interests, whether composed 
of different classes, of ditfereut communities, formed into one general confede¬ 
rated community, and in which the majority is estimated, not in reference to 
the whole, but to eacli class or community of which it is composed, the assent 
of each, taken separately, and the concurrence of all constituting the majority. 
A majority, thus estimated, may be called the concurring majority. 

When it is objected to Nullification, that it is opposed to the principle, that 
a majority ought to govern, he who makes the objection must mean the abso¬ 
lute, as distinguislied from the concurring. It is only in the sense of the 
former the objection can be applied. In that of the concurring, it would be 
absurd, as the concurring assent of all the parts (with us, the States) is of the 
very essence of ouch majority. Again—it is manifest, that in the sense it 
would be good against Nullification, it would be equally so against the Constitu¬ 
tion itself; for, in whatever light that instrument may be regarded, it is ticarly 
not the work of the absolute, but of the concurring majority. It was formed 
and ratified by the concurring assent of all the States, and not by the majority 


of the whole taken in the a.i^gregate, as has been already stated. Thus the 
acknowledged l ight of each Htate in reference to the Constihition is unques- 
tionably the same right which Nullification attributes to each, in reference, to 
the unconstitutional acts of ty Government; and, if the latter be opposed to 
the right of a majority to govqrn, the former is equally so. I go farther. The 
objection might, with equal truth, be applied to all free States that have ever 
existed;^! mean States deserving the name, and excluding, of course, those 
which alter a factious and anarchial existence of a few years have sunk under 
the yoke of tyranny, or the dominion of some foreign power. There is not, 
with this exception, a single free State whose institutions are not based on the 
principle of tlie concurring mpjority—not one, in which the community was 
not regarded in reference to its different political interests, and which did not, 
in some form or other, take the assent of each in the operunon of the Govern¬ 
ment. 

In .support of this assertion, I might begin with our own Government and go 
back to that of Sparta, and show, conclusively, that there is not one on the 
list, whose institutions w-ere not organized on the principle of the concurring 
majority, and, in the operation of which, the sense of each great interest was 
not separately consulted. The various devices, which have been contrived 
for this purpose, with the peculiar operation of each, would be a curious and 
highly important subject of investigation. I can only allude to some of the 
most prominent. 

The principle of the concurring majority has sometimes been incorporated 
in the regular and ordinary operation of the Government, each interest having 
a distinct organization, and a combination of the whole forming the Govern¬ 
ment ; but still requiring the consent of each, within its proper sphere, to give 
validity to the measures of Government. Oftiiis modification, the British and ^ 
Spartan Governments are, by far, the most memorable and perfect examples. 

In others, the right of acting—of making and executing the laws—was vested 
in one interest, and the right of arresting, or Nullifying, in another. Of this I 
description the Roman Government is much the most striking instance. In 
others, the right of originating or introducing projects of laws, wasm one, and 
of enacting them, in another, as at Athens, where the Areopagus proposed and i 
the General Assembly of the people enacted laws. ^ 

These devices were all resorted to, with the intention of consulting tin# 
separate interests, of which the several communities were composed: and 
against all of which, the objection to Nullification, that it is opposed h) the will 
of a majority, could be raised with equal force—as strongly, and, I may say, 
much more so, against the unlimited, unqualified, and uncontrolable veto of a 
single tribune, out of ten, at Rome, on all laws and the execution of laws, as 
against the same right of a sovereign State (one of the twenty-four tribunes of 
this Union) limited, as the right is, to the unconstitutional acts of the General 
Government, and liable, as in effect it is, to be controlled by three-fourths of 
the co-States; and yet the Roman liepublic, and the other States to which I 
iiave relerred, are the renowned among free States, whose examples have 
diffused the spirit of liberty over the world, and which, if struck from the list, 
would leave behind but little to be admired or imitated. Tliere indeed would 
lemain one class deserving from us particular notice, as ours lielong to it; I 
mean Confederacies—but as a class, heretofore far less distinguished for 
power and prosperity, than those already alluded to—though, I trust, with the 
improvements we have made, destined to be placed at the very head of the 
illustrious list of States, wliich have bles.sed the world with examples ol well 
regulated liberty; and which stand, as so many oases in the midst of the 
desert of oppression and despotism which occupy so vast a space in.the chart 
of Governments. That such will be the great and glorious destiny of our 
.sy.slem, I fee! assured—provided WQ do not permit our Goverument to degeu- 



24 

Slowing no honors, exercising no patronage, having neither the faculty to 
reward, nor to punish, but endowed, simply, with the attribute to grant 
powers and ordain the authority to execute them. The result is inevitable. 
With so strong an instinct on the part of the Government, to throw off the 
restrictions of the Constitution, and to enlarge its powers ; and with such 
powerful faculties to gratify this instinctive impulse, the law-making, must 
necessarily encroach on the Constitution-making power, unless restrained 
by the most efficient check ; at least, as strong as ihat for wdiich we con¬ 
tend. It is worthy of remark, that all other circumstances being equal, the 
more dissimilar the interests represented by the two, the more powerful 
will be this tendency to encroach ; and it is from this among other causes, 
that it is so much stronger between the Government and the Constitution- 
making powders of the Union, where the interest are so very dissimilar, 
than betw'een the two in the several States 

That the framers of the Constitution were aware of the danger, w'hich I 
have described, w^e have conclusive proof, in the provision to which I 
have so frequently alluded. I rflean that which provides for amendments 
to the Constitution. 

I have already remarked on that portion of tliis provision, wliich with the 
view of strengthening the confederated pow-er, conceded to three fourths of 
the States a right to amend, which otherw ise could only have been exercised 
by tlie unanimous consent of all. It is remarkable, that wdiile this piov sion 
thus .strengthened the amending powder, as it regards the States, it imposed 
impediments on it, as far as the Government was concerned. The power 
of acting as a general rule is invested in the majority of Congress, but 
instead of permitting a majority to propose amendments, the provission 
requires, for that purpose, twm thirds of both liouses, clearly with a view 
of interposing a barrier, against the strong instietive appetite of the Govern¬ 
ment for the acquisition of power. But it w ould have been folly, in the ex¬ 
treme, thus carefully to guard the passage to the direct acquisition, liad the wide 
door of construction been left open to its indirect; and, hence, in the same 
spirit in which two thirds of both houses were required to propose amendments, 
the Convention that framed the Constitution, rejected the many propositions, 
whicli were moved in the body, wdth the intention of divesting the States of 
the right of interposing, and thereby of the only effectual means of preventing 
the enlargement of the powers of tlie Government by construction. 

It is thus that the constitution-making power has fortiiied itself against the 
law-making; and that so effectually, that however strong the disposition and 
capacity of the latter to encroach, the means of resistance, ou the part of tlie 
former, is notl ss powerful. If, indeed, encroachments have been made, the 
fault is not in the .system, but in the inattention and neglect of those whose in¬ 
terest and duty it was, to interpose the ample means of protection afforded by 
the Constitution. 

To sum up in a few words, in conclusion, what appears to me to be the en¬ 
tire philosophy of Government, in reference to the subject of this communica¬ 
tion. 

Two powers are nece.ssary to the existence and preservation of free states: a 
power on the part of the ruled to prevent rulers from abusing their authority, 
by compelling them to be faithful to their constituents, and which is effected 
through tiie ugl.t of suffrage; and a power to compel the parts of society 

TO BE JU.ST TO OMi. ANOTHER, Bi' COMPELLING THEM TO CONSULT THE INTEREST. 

OF EACH OTHER, w liicli cau Only be effected, w’hatever may be the device for 
the purpose, by requiring the concurring as.sent of all the great and distinct 
interests of the community to the measures of the Government. This result, 
is the sum total of all the contrivances adopted by free States to preserve their 
liberty, by preventing the conflicts between the several classes, or parts of the 






•25 

community. Botli powers are indispensable. The one as much so as the other. 
The rulers are not more disposed to encroach on the ruled, than the diflferent 
interests of the community on one another; nor would they more certainly 
convert their power from the just and legitimate objects Ibr which ‘Govern¬ 
ments are instituted, into an instrument of aggrandizement, at the expense 
of the ruled, unless made responsible to their constituents, than w ould the 
stronger interest theirs,^ at the expense of the weaker, unless compelled to 
consult them in the measures of the Government, by taking their separate 
and concurring assent. The same cause operates in both cases. The con¬ 
stitution of our nature, which would impel the rulers to oppress the ruled, 
unless prevented, would, in like manner, and with equal Ibrce, impel the 
stronger to oppress the weaker interest. To vest the right of government in 
the absolute majority, would be, in fact, but to embody the will of the 

STRONGER INTFREST IN THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND NOT THE 
AVILL OF THE AVHOLE COMMUNITY, AND TO LEAVE THE OTHERS UNPROTECTED, 
A PREY TO ITS AMBITION AND CUPIDITY, just as would be the case, between 
rulers and ruled, if the right to govern was vested exclusively in the hands of 
the former. They would both be, in reality, absolute and despotic govern¬ 
ments ; the one as much so as the other. 

They would both become mere instruments of cupidity and ambition, in 
the hands of those, who wielded them. No one doubts, that such would be 
the case, were the government placed under the control of irresponsible 
rulers; but, unfortunately for the cause of liberty, it is not seen, wdth equal 
clearness, that it must as necessarily be so, w'hen controlled by an absolute 
majority; and yet, the former is not more certain, than the latter. To 
this, w^e may attribute the mistake so often and so fatally repeated, that to 
expel a despot is to establish liberty—a mistake to which we may trace 
the failure of many noble and generous etforts in favor of liberty. The 
error consists, in considering communities, as formed of interests strictly 
identical throughout, instead of being composed, as they in reality are, of as 
many distinct interests as there are individuals. The interests of no twm 
persons are the same, regarded in reference to each other; though they 
may be, viewed in relation to the rest of the community. It is this di¬ 
versity, which the several portions of the community bear to each other, in 
reference to the wdiole, that renders the principle of the concurring majori¬ 
ty necessary to preserve liberty. Place the power in the hands of the ab¬ 
solute majority, and the strongest of these wmuld certainly pervert the gov¬ 
ernment from the object for which it was instituted, the equal protection of 
the rights of all, into an instrument of advancing itself, at the expense of the 
rest of the community. Against this abuse of power no remedy can be de¬ 
vised, but that of the concurring majority. Neither the right of suffrage, 
nor public opinion can possibly check it They in fact, but tend to ag¬ 
gravate the disease. It seems really surprising, that truths so obvious 
should be so imperfectly understood. There would appear, indeed, a feeble¬ 
ness in our intellectual powers on political subjects, when directed to large 
masses. We readily see, why a single individual, as a ruler, would, if not 
prevented, oppress the rest of the community, but are at a loss to under 
stand, why seven millions would, if not also prevented, oppress six millions, 
as if the relative numbers on either side could, in the least degree, vary the 
principle. 

In stating what I have, I have but repeated the experience of ages, com¬ 
prehending all free governments preceding ours, and ours as far as it has pro¬ 
gressed. The practical operation of ours has been substantially on the prin¬ 
ciple ofthe absolute majority. We have acted, with some exceptions, as if 

3 


26 

the Gerieml Government had the right to interpret its own powers, without 
limitation, or check; and tho’ many cireumstances have favoured 
♦rreatly impeded tlie natural progress of events, under such an opeiation of 
the system yet we already see, in whatever direction we turn our eyes, the 
grow^g symptoms of disorder and decay-the growth of faction,cupid,ty 
Ind con-uption; and the decay of patriotism, integrity and disinterestedness. 
In the midst of youth, we see the flushed cheek and the short and feverish 
breath that mark the approach of the fatal hour; and come it will, un¬ 
less there be a speedy and radical change—a return to the great con¬ 
servative principle, which brought the Republican party into authority, but 
which, with the possession of power and prosperity, it has long since ceased 

to remember. , t i i 

I have now finished the task, which your request imposed. It 1 have been 
so fortunate, as to add to your fund, a single new illustration of this great 
conservative principle of our Government, or to furnish an additional argu¬ 
ment calculated to sustain the State in her noble and patriotic struggle to re¬ 
vive and maintain it, and, in which you have acted a part long to be remem¬ 
bered by the friends of freedom, I shall feel amply compensated for the time 
occupied, in so long a communication. I believe the cause to be, the cause 
of truth and justice, of Union, Liberty, and the Constitution, before which, 
the ordinary party struggles of the day, sink into perfect insignificance; 
and that it will be so regarded by the most distant posterity, I have not the 
.slightest doubt. 

With great, and sincere regard, 

I am vours, &-c. &c. 

' JOHN C. CALHOUN 

His Ex. James Hamilton, Jun. 

Governor of Carolina. 


[Governor Hamilton to Hon. John C. Calhoim.^ 

Pendleton Tuesday morning 1]. 1332.. 

My dear Sir. —On my return from Charleston last evening, I found your 
favor of the 28th ult. I embrace the earliest moment of making you my 
best acknowledgements for your obliging and most satisfactory compliance 
with the request I ventured to make you in my letter of the last month. 

I have read your reply with intense interest, and have risen from its peru¬ 
sal with a vastly augmented confidence in the truth and importance of the 
doctrines we believe, and are ready to maintain. 

You have added so much fresh and valuable matter, to your previous 
argument, that i am not so selfish or so little regardful of the obligations 1 
owe to the great cause in which we are embarked, as to desire to keep your 
reply exclusively to myself, more especially at the present crisis, when 
the truths you have unfolded are calculated to shed so much light on the 
public mind, on a public question of inestimable interest. Permit me then, 
on my own responsibility, to make our correspondence public, in such a 
mode as I shall deem best. 

I remain, my dear sir, with great esteem, 

very respectfully and truly yours, 

J. HAMILTON, Jun. 

IIoN. John C. Calhoun, V. p. of the U. S. 




[^Hon. John C. Calhoun to Governor Hamilton.'] 

Fort Hill, Tuesday cvcing, Wth Sept. 1832. 

My dear Sir. —I have received your note of this morning, requesting 
permission to publish my answer to your letter of the 31st July. 

Taking as, I do, the deepest interest in the subject of the note, to which 
my communication is an answer, and solemnly believing, that the success of 
our great and novel experiment in Government depends on the success of 
the doctrines, for which we contend, I would not feel myself justified in with¬ 
holding ray assent to any measure, which you and our friends may think cal¬ 
culated to shed additional light on the great principles in controversy ; and 
as it is your impression that the publication of ray answer will have that et- 
fect, you are at liberty to make what disposition of it you may think proper. 

My only fear is that your kind and partial feelings have over estimated the 
importance of the views, which I have presented. As to the responsibility, 
neccessarily incurred, in giving publicity to doctrines, which a large por¬ 
tion of the community will probably consider new and dangerous, 1 feel none. 

I have too deep a conviction of their truth, and their vital importance » 
to the Constitution, the Union, and the Liberty of these States, to have the I 
least uneasiness on that point. He but illy deserves the public confi- ' 
dence, ,who would shrink from the avowal of what he believes to be the | 
truth, in such a case, be the consequence to him, personally, what they may. | 
With sincere regard and esteem, I ani,&.c. # 

JOHN C. CALHOUN. 


His Ex. Gov. Hamilton. 








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